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A CODING ENABLED ANONYMITY NETWORK
SAIKRISHNA GUMUDAVALLY
ABSTRACT
An onion routing based anonymous communication system is developed to ad-
dress timing analysis attacks, a common limitation of many contemporary anonymous
systems including Tor. Timing analysis based attacks gained importance because sim-
ple payload check and packet inspection attacks are avoided by encrypting packets.
Timing information gathered at one part of the network is correlated with information
gathered at other parts to break the anonymity. Network coding, a recently developed
packet forwarding technique, is used to disrupt timing attacks. The system uses a
multicast tree of onion routers (OR) through which the packets are relayed to desired
destinations. Packets from different users are grouped and linearly transformed over
a finite field before forwarding them into the multicast tree. Encoding/transforming
the packets evenly spreads the information among all encoded output packets making
them equally important and informative. The system creates similar traffic pattern
on all the links of the tree. Since the traffic pattern for all the ORs in the tree is
similar, it becomes difficult to launch timing attacks. Extensive experiments are car-
ried out for TCP communications using the Network Simulator-2 for different sizes
of the multicast tree and probability of detecting a communication is equal to the
probability detection through a random guess, equal to 1/n, where n is number of
ORs in last layer of the multicast tree. By increasing the number of leaf ORs in the
tree decreases the detection probability and increase the degree of anonymity.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Most contemporary anonymous systems are built on the concept of onion rout-
ing. Onion routing has been widely accepted from the time that was initially intro-
duced by Chaum [5]. In onion routing, first the data is repeatedly encrypted with the
public keys of intermmediate nodes called the mixes then when the traffic is routed
through these mixes, each mix decrypts a layer of encryption and delays the traffic
before forwarding the data to the next hop. For applications which require lower
latency for better QoS such as web browsing, anonymous sytems such as TOR are
often used. Since oinon layer of encrytion hide the destination and payload, many
flow based attacks are developed. These attacks use timing information gathered at
different parts of the network to break anonymity. Contemporary systems are vulner-
able to timing attacks where the adversary tries to relate/link the traffic by collecting
packet timings or by inducing specific delay patterns or even counting the packets on
both ends of the communication [10]. Even systems like Tor are vulnerable to such a
strong adversary.
We use the novel concept of network coding to defend against timing attacks.
1
2A node forwards a linear combination of the incoming packets on the outgoing links.
In network coding, the packets are linearly transformed over a finite field [32]. In
network coding routing scheme, the intermediate nodes in the route to the final
destination have more importance and responsibilities when compared to the tradi-
tional store and forward routing schemes. The intermediate nodes not only buffer
the incoming packets as usual but also combine/encode them with existing packets
before forwarding. An encoded packet contains a trace of information from all the
original packets used during the encoding process. A node has to solve the linearly
encoded data to get actual information. It has been applied to applications such as
P2P [6,12], wireless network [17,31] and unicast communication [34]. Network coding
is more robust to link failures and node failures, because the information is evenly
spread throughout the encoded packets making them equally important [12]. Figure
1 is an example of network coding. The incoming packets denoted by X, Y and Z are
linearly encoded to produce output O1, O2 and O3. The set of coefficients used for
linear transformations is called encoding vector. For output O1, the encoding vector
is [2 3 2].
X
O2=X+Y+Z
O3=X+5Y+2Z
Y
Z
O1=2X+3Y+2Z
Figure 1: Network Coding Example
The destination has to collect sufficient encoded packets in order to begin
decoding. For pratical implementation of this scheme, the original data packets are
batched into groups called generations, and only packets belonging to same generation
are encoded and decoded together [33]. In the proposed system, packets from different
users are combined and transmitted over a multicast tree containing layers of onion
routers (OR). The root OR of the multicast tree groups the available packets into
3generations and forms the random linear combinations. The encoded packets are
repeatedly encrypted by the root and then transferred from one layer to another in
the multicast tree. On receiving a packet, an intermediate OR decrypts a layer of
encryption and randomly selects an OR in the next layer to forward the packet. An
encoded packet contains a trace of information from all the original packets, so it
cannot be linked to any particular user, and all the ORs in the tree receive similar
amount of traffic making it difficult for an adversary to launch timing attacks. The
users run a program called onion proxy (OP). An OP helps in tree contruction and
relaying data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 gives a review on the
related works to the proposed system. In Chapter 3 goals are summurized. Chapter
4 describes the threat model and assumptions made. Chapter 5 deals with the design
and implementation of the system. Theoretical analysis of performance evaluation
parameters are explained in 6. Performance of the proposed system is evaluated in
Chapter 7 and conclude with Chapter 9.
CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
2.1 Anonymous Communication Systems
Chaum [5] initially introduced the idea of using public key cryptography to
hide the source and destination of a communication. The messages are repeatedly
encrypted with the public keys of the mixes in the path to the destination. When the
encrypted messages are routed through these mixes, each mix will decrypts a layer of
encryption and introduce a random delay before relaying to the next hop. Any inter-
mediate node (Mix) has no knowledge about the complete route except the previous
and next hop. Since its introduction many anonymous systems have been proposed
that use the concept of onion routing. Tor [7], the second generation onion router,
is a low latency anonymous system which incrementaly builds circuits along the net-
work and the traffic is routed through these circuits. Tor provides perfect forward
secrecy by using TLS encrytion and also provides additional features such as con-
gestion control and integrity checking. Anonymous systems like Maxminion [10] and
Mixmaster [29] are built on the concept of onion routing, but provide anonymity using
4
5timed dynamic pool batching which introduce large latencies to disrupt timing anal-
ysis attacks. Such large delays are not viable for some applications like web browsing
where delay decreases the QoS. Tarzan [9] and Morphmix [23] provide anonymous
communication for P2P overlays by trying to hide the origin of the traffic. Every
node acts as a relay as well as generates its own traffic. Both these methods are
based on onion type layered encryption. The concept of crowds introduced in [22],
concentrates on hiding the origin of the traffic. Each member of the crowd is equally
probable to be the initiator of the traffic. The larger the crowd, the greater the degree
of anonymity. In crowds, more control is needed over the browser in order to pro-
vide a higher degree of anonymity. Anonymizer [1] and JAP [3] provide anonymity
by aggregating the traffic from different users. Anonymizer uses a single hop proxy
where as JAP uses a distributed trust system. JAP builds fixed circuits involving
series of mixes called the cascade, through which traffic is relayed. In [16], a method
of anonymous communication has been proposed which makes use of network coding
technique to scramble the message and transfer the pieces of the message along dis-
joint paths. Here the anonymity and the confidentially provided are slightly weaker
than in systems that use public key cryptography.
2.2 Possible Attacks on Current Systems
Since the development of the onion routing technique which avoids simple pay-
load comparison attacks, many flow based anonymity attacks have been proposed.
These attacks make use of timing information to relate the traffic flows. An adver-
sary who is observing the traffic, gathers the timing information and uses various
techniques to relate the traces obtained [24]. A more powerful adversary can induce
distinct delays into the traffic and observes traffic pattern at other parts of the net-
work for such distinct patterns [7]. In [35] and [36], flow separation methods are
6proposed which make use of the Blind Source Separation algorithm which separates
the flows from the mixed traffic of a mixer into individual flows. Once the flows are
separated various techniques can be applied to relate and detect the traffic.
2.3 Network Coding Techniques
We use the technique of network coding to overcome the above mentioned
possible attacks. Network coding provides an opportunity to fully utilize network
capacity and has the potential to increase the throughput while being robust to lossy
links [19] and node failures. In network coding, the intermediate nodes not only buffer
the incoming packets as usual but also combine/encode them with existing packets
before forwarding. Network coding requires nodes to have high computational power
to perform the tasks like encoding and decoding [8]. In a network, the broadcast
capacity is limited by the minimum cut between the sender and the receiver. This
maximum capacity is not attainable by traditional forwarding schemes however with
network coding this maximum can be reached [2]. In [32], a network coding algorithm
is developed for time varying cyclic networks based on the max-flow min-cut theorem
produces minimum possible delay while achieving broadcast capacity. Information is
considered as a vector over a finite field on which each node applies a linear transfor-
mation before forwarding and it has been proven that for the linear transformation
a finite symbol size is sufficient to have linear coding for multicast purpose [32]. A
framework is developed in [18] to apply network coding to arbitrary networks to
achieve network capacity. Network capacity can be achieved with high probability by
randomly selecting the linear mapping of inputs to form the output [15, 18, 32]. The
upper bound on the failure to decode is in the order of the inverse of the finite field
size of random variables used for coding. In conclusion, using a larger field size for
encoding significantly reduces the probability of failure [14].
7“Avalanche” is a network coding mechanism for large scale content distribution
[12]. It solves almost all of the issues in the current file swarming mechanisms such
as rare blocks, load on servers and eliminates the need to increase network resources
in order to provide better file sharing services. This system takes advantage of the
uniform distribution of information among all the encoded packets to eliminate the
rare blocks problem. In P2P networks, network coding helps in faster file transfer
with little CPU overhead and is able to provide better service to all the peers in a
topology including the the peers that are behind NAT and firewalls [11]. A practical
implementation of the network coding technique is provided in [33]. Here the packets
are grouped into generations and only the packets from the same generation can
be encoded and decoded together. By buffering the packets, it deals with random
link loss and synchronization problems caused by congestion delay. Attaching the
encoding vector along with the block sent out makes it robust and helps in extraction
of the original blocks. Encoding vecor is a series of coefficients used during encoding
process. Network coding by default provides some light weight security because the
adversary needs to obtain sufficient encoded packets before retrieving actual data
which in some cases might be difficult for an adversary who has limited access and
control over the network. Confidentiality can be provided by simply encrypting the
encoding vector to counter malicious modifications done by the intermediate nodes
[30]. Secure network coding methods have been proposed in [4] and [28], to tackle
wiretappers while providing perfect forward secrecy.
CHAPTER III
GOALS
As described in Section 2, many timing-based anonymity attacks have been
proposed to compromise existing anonymity networks. Clearly, a novel network ar-
chitecture for anonymous communication is needed to defend against these attacks.
In addition to the goal of providing improved anonymity, the new network architec-
ture should satisfy the following requirements: (1) It must provide sender anonymity
and receiver anonymity [21]. (2) It is capable of providing low-latency communica-
tion services. Because of the popularity of Internet applications which require low
latency such as web browsing and VoIP, low latency is a must for usable anonymity
networks. (3) Simple and proven anonymizing techniques should be included in the
new anonymity network architecture to avoid previous pitfalls. In this paper, the
onion-based layered encryption previously implemented and verified in Onion Rout-
ing [13, 26, 27] and Tor [7] are extended for the coding-enabled anonymity network
architecture,1 since the onion-based layered encryption can hide source and destina-
tion address information from intermediate nodes to protect anonymity even when
1We believe the new architecture without the onion-based layered encryption is possible. We
plan to investigate in our future work.
8
9some intermediate nodes are compromised.
We do not include defense against end-to-end timing-based traffic analysis as
one of our design goals. End-to-end timing-based traffic analysis, such as correlating
traffic flows entering and leaving an anonymity network, can effectively link com-
munication parties. These end-to-end traffic analysis attacks are not considered as
in previous studies [7], because these attacks are based on traffic flow information
collected outside an anonymity network. In Section 8, we introduce a possible coun-
termeasure for these end-to-end traffic analysis attacks.
In this paper, we do not base the new anonymity network architecture on
peer-to-peer network structure such as Tarzan [9] because of known problems of peer-
to-peer structure used for anonymity [9, 23].
CHAPTER IV
THREAT MODEL
4.1 Capability of Adversary
The main goal of the system is to provide anonymous communication for both
source and the destination pair. It is assumed that the adversary has control over
some parts of the network. The adversary here has access to some parts of network
and can observe and modify the traffic on all the links in those parts. All the links
between OR’s are TLS encrypted which provides perfect forward secrecy, thus any
modifications to the data transferred can be detected. The adversary can launch
traffic analysis attacks by correlating the timing information of the packets. The
adversary can match the traffic patterns by causing distinct delays or disrupting
the traffic [7]. The adversary has the capacity to build the traffic pattern of the
packets emerging from a particular user and try to match with the traffic patterns
collected from other parts of the network, thus identifying the communication. The
adversary might also run an OR that is corrupted or malicious. The attacker can
launch Denial of Service attack on trustworthy OR’s and divert the traffic to a group
10
11
of OR controlled by it [7]. The malicious OR can also give false information like
available bandwidth to the directory servers so that it is included in the multicast
tree. By doing so, it can launch the attacks where it drops the packets and not
forward as instructed and to see where in the network the traffic halts or packets
are sent to a group controlled by the adversary when the key has been compromised.
Here a faulty OR can disrupt only the traffic that pass through it and cannot effect
traffic on other links. By performing the above mention activities the adversary can
only disrupt the traffic but cannot decrease the anonymity of the system.
4.2 Assumptions
Not all nodes can be compromised at the same time and the adversary cannot
have access to all parts of the network thus end to end timing analysis cannot be
performed. All the packets are end to end encrypted for higer secrecy is needed. It
is also assumed that all the OR’s provide correct information about their public keys
as they are used during the tree construction phase. An OR in the tree has only
knowledge of previous layer ORs and next layer ORs. The root OR has access to
multiple IP. This is a reasonable assumption considering the popularity of VPN [16].
CHAPTER V
DESIGN
Onion routing is the most commonly used technique in anonymous communi-
cation. The proposed system is built on the widely accepted low latency anonymous
system called Tor [7]. The proposed packet forwarding system combines the concept
of onion routing with the recently developed network coding technique to avoid tim-
ing analysis attacks, while inheriting the onion routing immunity towards many other
attacks.
5.1 Design Overview
Users run a program called the Onion Proxy which helps in communicating
with the onion routers. A group of Onion Proxies/users (OPs) come together to build
a multicast tree of ORs. The multicast tree is used by all the OPs involved in tree
construction to anonymize their traffic. The multicast tree contains layers of onion
routers. The multicast tree of ORs is constructed layer by layer and each OP chooses
an OR of choice to be included in a layer. An OR in a layer is connected to every
12
13
OR in the next layer. The leaf ORs of the tree are called the exit ORs and the last
layer is called the exit layer. OPs connect to the tree through the root of the tree.
After the multicast tree construction, packets from different users (OPs) are
collected and encoded by the root of the tree before forwarding them in the tree. The
group of packets that are encoded together is given a name denoted by Generation
Sequence Number . The number of packets in this group is given by the Generation
Size gs. The root OR in Figure 2 encodes the packets from user A and user B. The
A
B
Layer 1
Root OR
Exit Layer
Encode
Encrypt
Forward Decrypt
Forward
Decrypt
Decode
Forward
D
C
T=0 T=1
T=2
T=2
Figure 2: Overview
root repeatedly encrypts the encoded packets with the keys it shares with the ORs in
each layer of the multicast tree. The keys used by the root OR for layer encryption are
formed and shared during the tree construction process. The hashed box represents
the encoded packet and circles around it represent layer encryption. The root forwards
the encoded and encrypted packets to first layer of the multicast tree. Packets are
forwarded from one layer to the next. When an OR receives a packet, it decrypt a
layer and then select an OR in the next layer to send the packet. A layer of encryption
is decrypted at each layer of the multicast tree. Last layer of encryption is decrypted
by exit ORs. Since all layers of encryption are now removed, the exit ORs gets the
encoded packets. The exit ORs then decode the encoded packets that belong to the
same generation. The decoding process starts only if exit OR has received sufficient
encoded packets of that generation or gs encoded packets. The decoded packets are
14
forwarded to actual destination by the exit ORs, here server C and server D. It can
be seen that all the exit ORs receive the packets at the similar time and also receive
similar amount of traffic. Thus making it difficult for an adversery to link an encoded
packet to a either user A or user B. Depending on the context, OP and the root
OR use different types of packets for the tree construction. The packet format is a
modified version of the packet format used in Tor. Additional header fields are added
to accommodate the needs of encoding and decoding involved in network coding. The
tree construction is based on Tor circuit formation. Like in Tor each onion router
maintains an identity key for signing the TLS certificates and other onion keys to
decrypt packets from the root OR of the tree.
5.2 Packet Format
The ORs and OPs communicate with each other over TLS links using packets
of length determined by the OPs. There are two types of packets used in this scheme
of data forwarding. They are control packets and relay packets.
5.2.1 Control Packet
A control packet carries different types of commands. When an OR receives
a control packet it would act according to the command in the packet. The packet
format for the control packet of length 512 bytes is shown in the Figure 3 and ex-
planantion of each field follows.
 
 
   
	
 
ytes
2 1byte
Figure 3: Control Packet
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Circuit identifier is a local value; it changes from one hop to another. It is the
mutually agreed name given to the link between the sender and the receiver of this
packet. The CMD field indicates the command a packet carries. The commands in
a control packet are create, created, group, grouped, change and changed . A create
packet is sent out to build a circuit between the sending OR and the receiver of the
packet. A created packet is used as an acknowledgment for a create packet. The
receiver of a group packet recognizes the sender as an OR in the previous layer of the
tree. A grouped packet is used as an acknowledgment for a received group packet. A
change packet is used to transfer keys from the root to a newly formed layer of ORs.
A changed packet is used as an acknowledgement for a received change packet.
5.2.2 Relay Packet
The relay packets are used to transfer end to end information [7]. The relay
packets have additional header fields when compared to the control packets. The
format is shown in Figure 4.
         

  
	


 
 




LEN

GSQ ENC
VEC

  
	

Figure 4: Relay Packet
Circuit identifier field serves the same purpose as mentioned before. The relay
header field length denotes the length of the packet, CRC is a checksum used to check
packet integrity and CMD byte is used to indicate the type of the relay command.
The relay commands are extend (used to extend an existing connection), extended
(sent out when an extension is succesfully completed), keychange (used to broadcast
the layer key for a particular layer ), keychanged (reply to keychange packet sent after
successful transfer of the layer key). GSQ denotes the Generation Sequence Number
16
Table I: Key Notation
Notation Owner Purpose
PKi ORi Public key of node i. It is used to send encrypt packets to ORi.
Exampe: PK11 denotes public key of the onion router OR11
PKTi ORi Public Key of ORi, used for tree construction and key sharing.
T denotes that the key is specific to this tree. Also referred to as tree
public key of ORi.
PKT
SLi
Root (S) Public Key of the root OR used for key sharing with the
ith layer of the tree. This key is used by the root to transfer layer key to the
ith layer of the multicast tree. Also referred to as
tree public key of S for ith layer. Li denotes ith layer.
KS
Li
Root (S) Symmetric key S shares with all the ORs in the ith layer.
Used for layer encryption by the root OR. Also referred to as
the root layer key for the ith layer.
KOP
Li
Onion Proxy (OP) Symmetric key all the OPs shares with all the OR in
the ith layer. Used to encrypt information to be sent to the ith layer of
the tree from the OPs. Also referred to as OP layer key for ith layer.
KSOPi
OP and S Symmetric key shared between the ith OP denoted by OPi
and the root S.
PKT
Ei
Exit OR of ORi Public key of the exit OR on the tree whose root OR is ORi
to which the packet belongs and encoding vector is the series of linear coefficients
that were used during the encoding process by the root to generate that packet. The
relay cells are iteratively encrypted by the root with the keys it shares with the ORs
in the intermediate layers of the tree.
The OPs, the root and the intermmediate ORs communicate with each other
using the relay and the control packets. Different keys are used to encrypt these
packets depending upon the source, destination and other parties invloved in the
communication. Various keys used and their notations are given in the Table I.
5.3 Tree Construction
The proposed system makes use of a multicast tree of onion routers to anonymize
traffic. When an OP wants to anonymize its communication, it connects to the root
of the multicast tree and multiple OPs connect to the root. The root of the multicast
tree will combine/encode the packets from different OPs and forward them in the
tree. The root of the tree is also responsible for the layer encryption of the encoded
packets. The root repeatedly encrypts the encoded packets with the symmetric keys
17
shared with the ORs in each layer of the tree.
To begin the multicast tree construction, each OP negotiates a symmetric key
with the root. This key is used to encrypt the packets exchanged between the root
and the OP.
The tree is constructed incrementally, one layer at a time. The OPs decide
the ORs that are to be included in a layer of the tree. After connecting to the root,
each OP chooses an OR that will be in the 1st layer of the tree. Each OP sends out
a relay extend packet to the root, instructing it to include the chosen OR in the first
layer. The root forms a set of control packets for the chosen ORs to make them part
of the tree. These control packets contain information about the tree and keys used
for encryption. After forming the 1st layer, the OPs will send relay extend packets
to the 1st layer ORs instructing them to extend the tree to the next layer. The OPs
follow a similar procedure of instructing the last layer to extend the tree to a new
layer until a tree of required size is formed. The root of the tree shares a symmetric
key with each layer of the tree. Whenever the ith layer is added to the tree, the root
S forms the root layer key KSLi and shares it with the ORs in the newly formed i
th
layer, denoted by Li. The encoded packets are layer encrypted by the the root using
these shared keys.
5.3.1 Establishing Connections Between the OPs and the
Root
To build a muticast tree with the OR S as the root, all the OPs need to
establish a connection with the OR S. An OP sends a create packet to establish a
connection and to negotiate a symmetric key with the root. This key is used by an
OP to encrypt any packet sent to the root. This key is denoted by KOPiS , shared
between an Onion Proxy OPi and the root S.
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The packets exchanged between the root S and an onion proxy OPi during
this phase are depicted in Figure 5. To create a new connection, OPi sends a create
packet along with the first half of Diffie-Hellman handshake P x in the payload to the
root S. The root S responds with a created packet. The payload contains the second
half of Diffie-Hellman key exchange P y and the hash of the key formed. After the
exchange of create and created packets, OPi and the root S have both the halves
of key exchange algorithm, so they can form KOPiS . In Figure 5, the packets are
numbered according to the order of events.
OPi S
{ }
SPK
xPGCreate ,
[ ] TSyOPS Li PKPKHGCreated 1,,,1
2
Figure 5: Creating Circuits
G is the circuit identifier. Circuit identifier is a unique name given to the
link between two ORs or an OR and an OP. The payload of the created packet also
contains PKTSL1 , the tree public key of the root S used for the key transfer from the
1st layer ORs denoted by L1 to the root. PKTSL1 will be sent by the OPs to the ORs
that will be included in the 1st layer of the tree. H is the hash function. All the OPs
exchange create and created packets with the root to form the symmetric key.
5.3.2 Extending the Tree to Layer 1
After connecting with the root, the OPs extend the tree to the 1st layer by
sending out relay extend packets to the root. Each OP chooses an OR to be a part
of the 1st layer, so the number of ORs per layer n in the multicast tree is equal to the
number of OPs connected to the root. Each OP sends to the root an extend packet
which contains the identity of the chosen OR and the keys used for encrypting future
packets from the OPs destined for the 1st layer ORs. The root copies the payload of
an extend packet into a group packet. The group packets are forwarded to all the
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Figure 6: Multicast Tree Extending to Layer 1
ORs mentioned in the extend packets. An OR responds to a group packet with a
grouped packet. A grouped packet contains confirmation of receipt by the chosen OR
in the payload. A grouped packet is converted to a relay extended packet by the root
and forwarded to the OPs.
For simplicity of explanation, as an example, consider the extend packet sent
by OP1 in the Figure 6. It is
Relay G1
{
Extend OR11
[
KOPL1 , R
OP1
1 , R
OP1
2 , PK
T
SL1
, F lag
]
PK11
}
K
OP1
S
.
G1 is the circuit identifier. As mentioned, KOPiS is used to encrypt any packet ex-
changed between OPi and the root S. Here the extend packet is encrypted with
KOP1S . Extend OR11 indicates that OP1 wants the onion router OR11 to be included
in 1st layer of the tree. The payload is encrypted with the public key PK11 of the
onion router OR11, so that only the onion router OR11 will be able to retrive the
information. KOPL1 is a symmetric key created by the OPs to encrypt all of the future
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packets destined to the 1st layer ORs denoted L1. All the OPs use the same OP layer
key KOPL1 in their extend packets for the 1
st layer. To form KOPL1 , all the OPs exchange
a series of messages that contain contributions from each OP towards the formation
of KOPL1 [25]. We assume these contributions are exchanged between the OPs before
the formation of the extend packets. ROP11 and R
OP1
2 are a pair of random numbers
generated by OP1. R
OP1
1 will be a part of the reply as a confirmation of receipt by
the intended OR and ROP12 will be used to encrypt the payload of the reply packet.
PKTSL1, the tree public key of the root is used to transfer keys between the root S
and the 1st layer ORs. The flag value can either be 0 or 1 depending on whether
OR11 is the intermmediate OR or an exit OR.
The root S copies the payload of the extend packets into the group packets.
For the 1st layer construction, each extend packet is converted to n group packets.
These n group packets are forwarded by the root S to the chosen OR using different
IP addresses. Each of these n group packets sent to an OR contain different circuit
identifiers but the same payload. Same set of IP addresses are used to send group
packets to each of the ORs mentioned in the extend packets. We make use of multiple
IP addresses so that the root would appear like any other layer in the multicast tree.
The number of multiple IP addresses used by the root to connect to each OR in the
1st layer is equal to number of ORs per layer n. The ORs receiving the group packets
consider the senders as the previous layer ORs. In the example given, the root S has
multiple connections with the onion routers OR11, OR12 and OR13. There are three
connections between the root S and each of the onion routers OR11, OR12 and OR13,
giving a total of nine connections between the first layer and the root S.
An OR replies to a group packet with a grouped packet. Depending upon the
flag and the keys received in the group packets, OR11 will form the payload of the
grouped packets. The payload of the grouped packet sent out by OR11 contains
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[
PKTE11, PK
T
11, R
OP1
1
]
R
OP1
2
,
[
PKT11
]
PKT
SL1
Random number ROP11 is obtained from the group packets received by OR11. Including
ROP11 in the reply packet serves as a confirmation that the tree was extended to OR11.
If the flag value in the received group packets is set then PKTE11 represents the public
key of the exit OR in the tree for which the onion router OR11 is the root, E11 denotes
the exit OR in the tree for which the onion router OR11 is the root. If the flag value
is zero then PKTE11 will be replaced by padding bits. PK
T
E11
is needed by the OP to
form the return address. Detailed explanation about the use of PKTE11 is presented
in section 5-C. PKT11, the tree public key of the onion router OR11, is included twice
in the grouped packet because only the root and OP1 need to know this information.
PKT11 is used by the root to encrypt the root layer key shared between the root S
and layer 1 ORs during the key exchange process. PKT11 is used by OP1 to encrypt
any data sent to the onion router OR11. Since the root has no information about the
random number ROP12 used to encrypt the reply, PK
T
11 has to be encrypted seperately
using PKTSL1 so that the root will be able to retrive it. If PK
T
11 is made public then
other ORs which select the OR S as their exit OR can relate the exit OR public key
given to them with this information.
When the grouped packets are received by the root S it retrives tree public
keys (example PKT11) from the payload and copies the rest into an extended packet
and forwards it to the OPs. The extended packet is broadcasted to all the OPs
but only OP1 will be able to verify the extended packet. The extended packets are
broadcasted because the root cannot relate an extend packet to the corresponding
extended packet. Since OP1 knows R
OP1
2 , it can decrypt the extended packet for
confirmation and verification that the tree was extended to the onion router OR11.
The root S will also include PKTSL2, the root public key for layer 2 denoted by L2, in
the payload of the extended packet, so that this key can be included in the extend
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packets for layer 2.
If an OP does not receive any reply packet for the extend packet sent out,
then it would send an Unsuccessfull packet to the root. The root broadcasts a resend
packet to all of the OPs. A resend packet indicates to the OPs that the tree extension
could not be completed successfully.
5.3.3 Transferring the Root Layer Key for Layer 1
The root shares a unique symmetric key with each layer of the multicast tree.
These keys are used by the root to form the onion layers of encryption. After the
1st layer of the tree is formed, the root S forms a root layer key KSL1 for layer 1 ORs
denoted by L1. This layer key is forwarded to all of the ORs in the 1st layer. To
transfer the root layer key to layer 1 ORs, the root S forms a change packet. The
payload contains blocks of the root layer key and a random number. Each block
contains the root layer key and a random number. Each block is encrypted with
the public key of an OR in the 1st layer. The root OR gets the public keys of the
ORs from the grouped packets. Figure 7 shows the packets exchanged with the onion
router OR11 during the key transfer process. The onion router OR11 replies a change
packet with a changed packet.
{
KSL1, R
S
a
}
PKT
11
is an encrypted block formed by the
root for OR11 and can only be decrypted by the onion router OR11. R
S
a is a the
random number chosen by the root S.
[
RSa
]
KS
L1
can only be formed by OR11 thus
serving as a confirmation of receipt. The payload of the changed packet sent by OR11
contains
[
RSa
]
KS
L1
confirming that layer key is received by the intended OR.
KSL1 is shared between all of the ORs in the 1
st layer and the root S. All future
packets from the root to the 1st layer ORs are encrypted using this key and vice versa.
The root S exchanges similar packets with all the ORs in 1st layer of the tree.
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Figure 7: Packet Exchanged during Key Transfer
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Figure 8: Multicast Tree Extending to New Layer
5.3.4 Extending the Tree to the 2nd Layer
As mentioned earlier, the OPs send the extend packets to the last layer for
extending the tree to a new layer. To build the 2nd layer, the OPs send extend
packets to the 1st layer ORs. An onion proxy OPi encrypts the extend packet with
KOPL1 , the key OPs share with the layer 1 ORs and with K
OPi
S , the key it shares with
the root. The OPs encrypt the extend packets with KOPL1 so that the root will not be
able to view its contents. The packets exchanged during this process are depicted in
Figure 8 and Figure 9.
The root S will decrypt the packets it receives from the OPs with the respective
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shared keys. In the example given, the decrypted packets are denoted by A, B and C
A =
{
Extend 21
[
KOPL2 , R
OP1
3 , R
OP1
4 , PK
T
SL2
, F lag
]
PK21
}
KOP
L1
B =
{
Extend 22
[
KOPL2 , R
OP2
3 , R
OP2
4 , PK
T
SL2
, F lag
]
PK22
}
KOP
L1
C =
{
Extend 23
[
KOPL2 , R
OP3
3 , R
OP3
4 , PK
T
SL2
, F lag
]
PK22
}
KOP
L1
The root S will form the linear combinations of A, B and C. The encoded packets are
layer encrypted with the layer keys which the root shares with each layer and in this
case its KSL1. When the onion routers OR11, OR12 and OR13 get three such coded
packets, they can decrypt the layer encryption by the root S and then decode to get
A, B and C. The ORs in the 1st layer know KOPL1 , so they can decrypt the encryption
done by the OPs, to get extend packets. As shown in Figure 8, the onion router
OR11 converts the extend packets into group packets and forwards them to the ORs
mentioned in the extend packets. In the example, the onion router OR11 will send
out the group packets to onion routers OR21, OR22 and OR23. OR12 and OR13 will
do the same as OR11. Each of these 2
nd layer ORs gets the required keys and other
information from the group packets and reply with the grouped packets along with a
confirmation of receipt in the payload. The structure of a grouped packet is discussed
in chapter 5.3.2 and the detailed contents of the packets exchanged can be viewed in
Figure 8.
When the onion router OR11 receives a reply from all of the 2
nd layer ORs, it
converts the grouped packets to extended packets. As shown in Figure 9 each OR
in the 1st layer receives the grouped packets with the same payload from the onion
router OR21. Since the contents in the payload of the group packets received by the
onion router OR21 are the same, the reply sent to the onion routers OR11, OR12 and
OR13 will also be the same. In other words, a grouped packet from the onion router
OR21 to the onion router OR11 will have the same payload as a grouped packet from
the onion router OR21 to the onion router OR12. So all of the ORs in layer 1 will
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Figure 9: Multicast Tree Extending to New Layer
form identical extended packets. These packets are denoted as X, Y and Z.
X = Extended
[
PKTE21 + PK
T
21 + R
OP1
1
]
R
OP1
x1
+
[
PKT21
]
PKT
SL2
Y = Extended
[
PKTE22 + PK
T
22 + R
OP2
1
]
R
OP2
x1
+
[
PKT22
]
PKT
SL2
Z = Extended
[
PKTE23 + PK
T
23 + R
OP3
1
]
R
OP3
x1
+
[
PKT23
]
PKT
SL2
All of the ORs in layer 1 form a linear combination of X, Y and Z. The encoded packet
is encrypted with KSL1 before relaying back to the root on one of the links connected
to previous layer. The root will receive 3 such encoded packets, one from each OR
in the 1st layer. The root will decrypt and decode the packets to get the extended
packets. The extended packets are relayed back to the OPs as mentioned before.
This is the only instance when an intermediate OR will encode data. Encoding helps
in reducing the number of replies sent back to the root OR.
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Figure 10: Transferring the root Layer Key to Layer 2
5.3.5 Transferring the Root Layer Key to the 2nd Layer ORs
As explained earlier, after extending to the ith layer in the multicast tree, the
root creates the root layer key KSLi for the i
th layer denoted by Li. This layer key is
shared with all the ORs in the ith layer. The root uses this key for layer encryption.
The root will use the tree public key of each OR in the ith layer (example PKT21) to
encrypt KSLi during key transfer. To transfer the key, the root forms a keychange
packet. The payload of a keychange packet contains blocks of the new root layer key
and a random number.
As shown in Figure 10, the payload of the keychange packet contains blocks of
the root layer key for the 2nd layer KSL2 and a random number. Each block is encrypted
with the tree public key of an OR in the 2nd layer. The keychange packet is forwarded
to a randomly chosen first layer OR, in example given it is OR11. The onion router
OR11 copies the payload of the keychange packet to a change packet and forwards
it to all of the ORs in the 2nd layer. The onion router OR21 replies with a changed
packet and includes receipt confirmation in the payload. The onion router OR11 will
receive similar confirmations from all of the ORs in the 2nd layer. A keychanged
packet is relayed back to the root after all of the confirmations are received. The
payload of the keychanged packet contains all the confirmations received from all the
2nd layer ORs.
To extend the tree to a new layer, the OPs instruct the last layer ORs to
extend the tree to another layer. The root transfers the root layer key for the new
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layer after the tree extension. The number of layers in the tree are decided by the
OPs. The root encodes and encrypts the packets that it receives from the OPs and
when an intermmediate OR receives a packet, it decrypts a layer of encryption and
forwards it on a randomly picked next layer OR. The packets are forwarded from
one layer to another layer and finally reach the exit layer. When an exit OR receives
gs packets of a particular generation, it can decode to get the actual data. After it
obtains the decoded information, an exit OR forwards the data to the destination.
The path taken by reply data is discussed in chapter 5.4. In case there is only a single
OP connected to the root OR, then there would be only one OR per layer. Packets
cannot be encoded because there is only one source available. However the packets
will be encrypted and relayed as before. The exit OR in the forward direction would
still be the root in the reverse direction.
5.4 Return Path
The reply data from a destination is routed back to the OP using a different
tree. The exit OR in the forward direction of traffic would be the root of the tree
for the reply traffic. To use an already constructed tree for reverse traffic, an OP
has to obtain the public key of an exit OR. An OP obtains this information from the
extended packet. During the tree construction, when an OP extends the connection
to an exit OR, it will set the flag in the extend packet to 1. When an OR receives
a group packet with the flag equal to 1, then it includes the public key of the exit
OR of its own tree in the grouped packets. An OP forms the return address by
encrypting its address with the given public key. The return address is included in
the data packets sent by the OP. The structure of the packet and the path taken by
a packet sent by an OP is shown in the Figure 11.
In the example shown in the Figure 11, the exit OR chosen by an onion proxy
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Figure 11: Reverse Traffic Path
OP1 is OR31. OR31′ is the exit OR in the tree for which OR31 is the root. PK
T
E31
is
the public key of onion router OR31′ . OP1 will use the public key of OR31′ to form
the return address {OP1}PKT
E31
. An OP encrypts a data packet with the tree public
key of the exit OR. In the example, a data packet from the OP1 is encrypted with
PKT31. An OP includes the address of the destination, data and a key to encrypt the
reply data from the destination in the payload of a data packet. After decoding a
generation, the onion router OR31 can decrypt
{
D, Data, KOP1E
}
PKT
31
to get the final
destination denoted by D. The onion router OR31 will forward Data to the final
destination D. The reply data from D is encrypted with KOP1E . K
OP1
E is a symmetric
key formed by OP1 and it is sent to exit OR denoted by E to encrypt the reply data
from a destination. The return address {OP}PKT
E31
is attached to the reply data.
The reply packet formed by OR31 is encoded along with other packets available with
OR31 and is sent along the tree for which OR31 is the root and OR31′ is one of the
exit OR. The return address can be decrypted only by the onion router OR31′ . When
the onion router OR31′ decrypts the return address to get the identity of the OP, it
will forward the encrypted reply data to the OP.
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Figure 12: Multicast Tree after Grouping
An already constructed tree is used for return traffic because an OP cannot
construct a new tree for the return traffic. For an OP to construct a tree, it has to
connect to the root of the tree and send control packets for the tree construction. But
if an OP connects to an exit OR to construct the tree, the exit OR would be able
identify the OP and can relate the traffic. For example, if OP connects to the onion
router OR31 to construct a tree with OR31 as the root OR for return traffic then the
onion router OR31 knows that OP will use it as an exit OR in another tree and will
be using its tree for reverse traffic. So to avoid this an already constructed tree is
used for return traffic. The complete topology is as shown in the Figure 12.
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5.5 Boot Up
When a system is booting up and there are no trees, the Directory Server (DS)
helps in the tree construction. Every node that enters the network is supposed be the
root of a tree. If there are no OPs available, the DS would randomly select a few ORs
already in the network which send control packets to the currently entering OR and
help in tree construction. When the OPs are available and ready to send packets, the
initially constructed tree is torn down and a new tree is constructed.
5.6 Addition of a New OP
When a new OP opts to join the group of OPs using a tree then a new tree
needs to be constructed. Since the addition of a new OP requires changes to all of
the previous session keys and a new OR needs to be added to each layer, it is easier
to form a new tree rather than adding ORs to the old tree. The old tree will not be
torn down until the new tree is completely constructed. To join a tree, an OP sends
a create packet to the root. The root will reply with a created packet. It sends a
notification of new tree construction to all other OPs through a new packet. The
root OR broadcasts this packet to all the OPs. On receiving new packet all the OPs
reply with the create packets. And the new tree is constructed as already discussed.
5.7 Forwarding Techniques
The root waits for gs packets to be received from the OPs before it starts
encoding the incoming packets (gs packets). The root OR forms the onion layers
of encryption after forming the random linear combination of the packets received.
Every OR when it receives a packet peels one layer of the onion encryption and
forwards it to an OR in the next layer of the tree. The key used for layer decryption
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is the key it shares with root and is same for all the ORs in that layer. The next layer
OR is selected based on the algorithm being followed to select the next layer OR. We
propose two algorithms; they are packet based and link based.
5.7.1 Packet Based Forwarding
In packet based forwarding, whenever a packet arrives at the intermediate OR
it will remove a layer of encryption and forward it to a randomly selection OR in
the next layer of the tree. There is no duplication of the packets at the intermediate
nodes. The exit node will only be able to decode if it receives gs encoded packets
from the previous layer. Because of random forwarding not all exit layer nodes will
receive gs packets. There is a possibility that an exit node will receive less than gs
packets of a particular generation. The probability that an exit layer node will be
able to decode a generation is given by Equation 5.1
N−gs∑
i=0
CNgs+i (n− 1)
N−gs−i
nN
(5.1)
Where value of n denotes the number of OR’s per layer, gs denotes generation
size and N denotes the number of unique and linearly independent packets formed
by the root for the generation.
5.7.2 Link Based Forwarding
In link based forwarding when the packets of a particular generation arrive at
an OR, it will forward the packet to next layer OR such that it will not send two
packets of same generation to the same OR and no two ORs will recieve same packet.
An OR on receiving a packet first decrypts a layer of the onion encryption and the
forwards the packet to next layer while satisfying the following conditions
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• A packet cannot be sent to more than one OR. There will not be any duplicate
copy at any time in the multicast tree.
• If there are n OR’s per layer in the tree then every OR will receive n packets from
previous layer, one from each OR in previous layer for a particular generation.
In this scheme of data forwarding the decoding probability is one because the
exit layer will have at least gs packets, if it is assumed that n >= gs. Always
number of ORs in each layer (n) must be greater than or equal to gs size so that
each exit layer OR will receive at least gs packets for decoding a generation.
In link based forwarding, a seperate onion is formed for the header field GSQ
because the intermediate ORs need to know the changes in GSQ.
5.7.3 Binary Coding Based Forwarding
In this scheme, each forwarding OR in the network will generate a random
binary vector. The forwarding OR will combine received packets using the binary
vector and forward combined packets. Since the coding vectors are generated ran-
domly, there may be duplicate packets with the same encoding vectors. Because of
these duplicate packets, the exit nodes may not have enough innovative packets for
decoding. Decoding probability for binary coding based forwarding in discussed in
Section 6.2.2
CHAPTER VI
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
6.1 Detection Rate
Many of the existing anonymous communication systems suffer from timing
analysis attack. In timing attacks, an adversery collects timings information from
one part of the network and correlates with the information gathered at another
part. To emulate such attacks packet timing information of a flow of interest is
matched with the timing information collected at the exit layer ORs. To match the
timing information collected mutual information concept is used. mutual information
calculated between the input flow and the actual output flow is higher than mutual
information calculated between the input flow and all other output flows then we
can link the traffic thus detect the communication. Entropy calculated using mutual
information is used as an indicator of communication detection. As mentioned, the
detection rate should be equal to a random guess which is 1/n and entropy should be
equal to log2n In network coding, any encoded packet cannot linked to a particular
original packet. An encoded packet contains a trace from all the original packets.
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Since the root of the multicast tree encodes packets from different OPs, the resultant
coded traffic cannot be linked to a particular OP and this combined with random
packet forwarding beacuse of which all the ORs receive similar traffic makes it difficult
to launch timings attacks.
6.2 Decoding Probability
6.2.1 Packet Based Forwarding
In a link based packet forwarding, the probability that a particular exit node
will decode is 1 if gs <= n. Every OR will receive n packets from previous layer,
one packet from each OR in the previous layer. The exit layer OR will decode once
it receives gs packets belonging to a particular generation. But in the packet based
forwarding, the decoding probability might be a value less than 1. On receiving a
packet, an intermmediate OR forwards it to a randomly selected next layer OR. The
random selection is independent of previous selections for packets belonging to the
same or a different generation. Due to random forwarding there is a possibility that
an exit OR might not receive gs packets that belong to the same generation.
Theorem 1 The probability that an exit OR will decode a particular generation is
given by
N−gs∑
i=0
CNgs+i (n− 1)
N−gs−i
nN
(6.1)
Proof N is the total number of encoded packets of a generation produced by root
OR. Total number of ways N different packets distributed among n exit nodes is
given by nN , which is represented by T . The chances that a particular exit layer OR
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will receive at least gs packets of a generation from N is given by F . So
F =
N−gs∑
i=0
CNgs+i × (n− 1)
N−gs−i ,
and
T = nN .
The probability that a exit layer OR will decode a generation is given by P = F/T .
Therefore
P =
N−gs∑
i=0
CNgs+i (n− 1)
N−gs−i
nN
.
6.2.2 Binary Coding Based Forwarding
An exit OR has to receive gs linearly independent packets of a generation to
start decoding. Since the linear cofficients are choosen from GF(2) field the total
number of linear combinations of gs original packets is given by 2gs. An encoded
packet is termed dependent if the encoding vector in that packet is a linear com-
bination of already received linearly independent encoding vectors. In other words
when an encoding vector in a packet can be formed by linear combination of encoding
vectors previous received then the packet does not bring any new information or is
not innovative thus does not contribute to decoding the generation.
Every exit OR receives n packets for a generation. For successfull decoding an
exit OR should recive gs independent encoding vectors or should not receive more
than n − gs dependent packets. So the threshold on number of dependent packets
an exit OR can receive is n − gs. If an exit OR receives more dependent packets
than this value then it will not be able to decode that generation. The probability of
an exit OR receiving gs independent encoding vectors is the sum of all probabilities
where the number of received dependent packets is less than or to equal n− gs.
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Theorem 1 The probability that an exit OR will be able to decode a generation is
given by
P =
((
1− 2
0
2gs
)(
1− 2
1
2gs
)
...
(
1− 2
gs−1
2gs
))
(
1 +
(
gs−1∑
i=0
2i
2gs
)
+
(
gs−1∑
i=0
2i
2gs
∗
(
gs−1∑
j=0
2j
2gs
))
+ ...(n− gs)terms
) (6.2)
Proof The probability that an encoding vector in an incoming packet is linearly in-
dependent depends on number of previously received linearly independent encoding
vectors of the same generation. If m is the number of already received linearly in-
dependent encoding vectors then the number of linearly dependent vectors that can
be formed from these m vectors is 2m. So probability that an incoming packet has
a linearly dependent encoding vector or an encoding vector from these 2m depen-
dent vectors is 2
m
2gs
. As an example, the probability that the first packet received
by an exit OR is linearly independent is
(
1− 2
0
2gs
)
. By continuing, the probabil-
ity that even the second packet received by an exit is also linearly independent is(
1− 2
0
2gs
)(
1− 2
1
2gs
)
and probability that the second packet is dependent on the first
packet is
(
1− 2
0
2gs
)(
21
2gs
)
. Probability that gs out of gs packet received are linearly
independent is
(
1− 2
0
2gs
)(
1− 2
1
2gs
)
....
(
1− 2
gs−1
2gs
)
.
The above probability is the perfect case. But we can receive upto n − gs
dependent packets. As an example, the probability for the first packet to be linearly
dependent is 2
0
2gs
. By continuing further, probability that even the second packet re-
ceived is dependent is
(
20
2gs
)(
20
2gs
)
and probability that the second packet received
by an exit is linearly independent is
(
20
2gs
)(
1− 2
0
2gs
)
. Probability that first packet
received is linearly dependent and the next gs packets received are linearly indepen-
dent is
(
20
2gs
)(
1− 2
0
2gs
)(
1− 2
1
2gs
)
.....
(
1− 2
gs−1
2gs
)
. Probability that first and second
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packet received are linearly dependent and the rest of gs packets received are linearly
independent is
(
20
2gs
)(
20
2gs
)(
1− 2
0
2gs
)(
1− 2
1
2gs
)
.....
(
1− 2
gs−1
2gs
)
. Extending the exam-
ple even further, the probability that first packet received is linearly independent but
the second and third packets received are linearly dependent and the rest of gs − 1
packets received are linearly independent is(
1− 2
0
2gs
)(
21
2gs
)(
1− 2
1
2gs
)(
22
2gs
)(
1− 2
2
2gs
)
.....
(
1− 2
gs−1
2gs
)
. Thus when we generalise
the above example for n ORs per layer, then the probability of decoding a generation
at an exit OR is given by summation of all the probabilities where number of received
linearly dependent packets is less than n− gs, which is((
1− 2
0
2gs
)(
1− 2
1
2gs
)
...
(
1− 2
gs−1
2gs
))
(
1 +
(
gs−1∑
i=0
2i
2gs
)
+
(
gs−1∑
i=0
2i
2gs
∗
(
gs−1∑
j=0
2j
2gs
))
+ ...(n− gs)terms
)
6.3 Through-put Calculation
In [20] the authors have developed an analytical formula for the steady state
throughput calculation of a TCP communication. It is widely accepted and used.
The TCP throughput is determined by the probability of a packet being lost, the
round trip time and time out value. The value of the throughput is limited by the
maximum possible congestion window size. The formula is given in Equation 6.3.
B (p) ≈ min

 W maxRTT ,

 1
RTT
√
2bp
3
+ T0min
(
1, 3
√
3bp
8
)
p (1 + 32p2)



 (6.3)
RTT is the round trip time, W max is the maximum size of the congestion
window, To is the timeout value, b is the number packets that are acknowledged
by an ACK and p is the probability that a packet will be lost during the commu-
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nication. We compare the theatrically calculated values of through-put B(p) using
Equation 6.3 against the practically obtained value. The throughput model developed
in [20] for a TCP communication takes into account congestion avoidance behavior,
retransmissions, timeouts and is valid for entire range of p.
CHAPTER VII
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We implement the proposed scheme using Network Simulator-2, which is an
event based simulator built using C++ blocks. Extensive experiments are performed
for various values of generation size (gs), number of ORs per layer (n) and number
of layers (nl) in the multicast tree. By varying these parameters, we calculated
delay, throughput and detection rate of a TCP communication. We studied the
influence of varying the generation size and size of multicast tree on the performance
metrics discussed in Chapter 6. The delay, throughput and detection rate of the
communication calculated from the experiments are compared to the theoretically
calculated values as explained in Chapter 6. The experiments are conducted over
TCP connections. A Galois field of size 28 is used by the root for the random linear
transformation of the incoming packets from the OPs. All the links in the topology
are of 10 Mb capacity and delay on each link is 10 ms unless otherwise specified.
Each simulation is carried out for 60 minutes. All the links between the intermediate
OR’s have on/off cross traffic with burst rate 5 Mbit/s, average burst time 500 ms
and average idle time 500 ms. The size and other parameters of the multicast tree
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for reverse traffic is same as multicast tree in the forward direction.
7.1 Packet Based Forwarding
7.1.1 Loss Probability
Decoding a generation of encoded packets takes place only after an exit OR
has collected gs packets of that generation. Since the packets are randomly forwarded
from one OR to another in the next layer, there is a possibility that an exit OR might
not receive gs packets of a generation. If the generation cannot be decoded, the exit
OR is not be able to retrieve the original packet and it is lost.
Figure 13(a) shows the variations of loss probability by varying the generation
size from 5 to 10. The decoding probability decreases with increase in gs with other
parameters kept constant because more number of encoded packets are needed by an
exit OR to start decoding. When decoding probability is high, the loss probability
is less. Figure 13(a) indicates that as gs increases, the loss probability increases.
Experimently obtained values are compared to the values calculated from equation
5.1. The loss probability in the experiments is obtained by the ratio of number
of generations that could be decoded to number of different generations that were
received by an exit OR.
The decoding probability increases with increase in number of ORs per layer
n because there are more number of encoded packets of a generation in the tree,
there is a greater chance that an exit OR will receive atleast gs encoded packets
of a generation, thus decreasing the loss probability. This explains the decrease in
loss probability with increase in n, as shown in Figure 13(b). Number of layers
in the multicast tree do not effect the decoding probability because the packets are
forwarded from one layer to another and decoding probability depends on distribution
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of encoded packets among the exit layer ORs. So even if number of layers are varied
the decoding probability remains the same.
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Figure 13: Comparison of Theoretical and Practical Values of Loss Probability
7.1.2 Throughput Variations
By Varying Generation Size
The experimently calculated throughput values are compared to theoritical
values calculated from Equation 6.3. Figure 14(a) shows throughput variations when
gs is increased from 5 to 10. The throughput decreases with increase in generation
size because as gs increases, more number of encoded packets are required by an exit
ORs to decode. As gs increases with other parameters kept constant, the decoding
probability decreases as suggested by Equation 5.1. This will lead to increase in loss
probability, which decreases the throughput as suggested in Equation 6.3. It can be
seen that rate of throughput decrease is less for n = 20 than n = 15 because more
number of encoded packets of a generation are present in tree when n is greater.
The effectiveness of an anonymous communication system is determined by
the rate at which the communication is detected. The detection scheme used here is
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based on timing analysis and is discussed in Section 6.1. The detection rate of a com-
munication using the proposed system is obtained using entropy which is calculated
by applying the concept of mutual information and correlation on the packet timings
gathered at the sender and the exit ORs. Figure 14(b) and Figure 14(c) show that the
entropy values calculated from correlation and entropy values calculated from mutual
information technique. The timing information of a flow of interest is compared with
the timing information of aggregate flow at each exit OR. It can be seen that entropy
calculated from experiments are almost equal to the entropy of equal distribution
indicating that all the exit ORs received similar amount of traffic. So the probability
of detecting the traffic is equal to probability of a random guess. As the number of
exit ORs increases, the entropy increases which decreases the probability of detection.
The probability of detection is less for n = 20 compared to n = 15.
By Varying Number of Layers
The round trip time increases with number of layers because the hop count
increases with layers in the multicast tree. When the number of hops (delay) increases,
the throughput of a TCP communication decreases as suggested by the Equation 6.3
and this explains the dip in the value of throughput in the Figure 15(a) for increase
in number of layers (nl) from 4 to 20. In Figure 15(b) and Figure 15(c) it can be seen
that varying nl in the multicast tree does not change the detection rate because the
detection rate depends on the number of ORs in the layer rather than the number of
layers itself. So n =15 has a different detection rate from n =20.
By Varying Number of ORs Per Layer (n)
In Figure 16(a), n is varied from 10 to 25 for 4, 8 and 12 layers in multicast
tree and gs =5. The throughput value increases with increase in the number of ORs
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Figure 14: Comparison of Theoretical and Practical Values of Throughput and De-
tection Rate for n =15, 20 and layers = 4, 12, 20
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45
per layer. This is because as n increases there will be more encoded packets in the
tree and so the loss probability decreases. Increase in decoding probability will lead
to decrease in loss probability, thus increasing the throughput. So n =25 has greater
throughput than n =10 as indicated in the Figure 16(a). In Figure 16(b) and Figure
16(c), the entropy for n =25 is greater than n =10 because the traffic is equally
distributed among larger group of exit ORs.
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Figure 16: Comparison of Theoretical and Practical Values of Throughput and De-
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7.2 Link Based Forwarding
The link based forwarding is discussed in the section 5 and as mention the
decoding probability of a link based forwarding technique is almost equal to 1.
7.2.1 By Varying Generation Size
Figure 17 shows throughput variations for link based forwarding scheme. It
can be observed that throughput values are uneffected by variation in gs because
when the decoding probability is 1 and loss probability is zero, then the throughput
value is the maximum possible value determined by RTT as suggested by Equation
6.3. Throughput for layers =4 is more than layer =12 because as number of layers
increase, the RTT value increase resulting in decrease of throughput. Figure 17(b)
and Figure 17(c) show entropy values for varying gs in the tree. Since all the ORs in
the exit layer receive similar traffic, the entropy values are almost equal to entropy of
a random guess, indicating that traffic cannot be detected.
7.2.2 By Varying Number of Layers
In Figure 18(a) it can be seen that as number of layers are increasing, the
throughput is decreasing because of increase in RTT with increase in number of hops
to final destination. The entropy values is same for nl = 4 and nl = 8 as shown in
Figure 18(b) and Figure 18(c) because the number of layers do not effect the traffic
distribution among the exit layer ORs and it is effected only by n.
7.2.3 By Varying Number of ORs per Layer(n)
In Figure 19(a) it can been seen that number of ORs per layer does not effect
the throughput. It is because increasing n does not effect the loss probability as it
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Figure 17: Comparison of Theoretical and Practical Values of Throughput and De-
tection Rate for n =15, 20 and layers = 4, 12, 20
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Figure 18: Comparison of Theoretical and Practical Values of Throughput and De-
tection Rate for n =15, 20 and gs = 5, 10
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will in case of packet forwarding technique and when the loss probability is zero then
throughput will reach the maximum possible value determined by RTT . In Figure
19(b) and Figure 19(c) the entropy value increases with n, indicating that probability
of detection decreases with increase in the number of ORs per layer because the traffic
is distributed among more ORs.
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Figure 19: Comparison of Theoretical and Practical Values of Throughput and De-
tection Rate for gs =5 and layers = 4, 12, 20
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7.3 Binary Coding Based Forwarding
7.3.1 Loss Probability
Decoding a generation of encoded packets takes place only after an exit OR has
collected gs linearly independent encoding vectors of that generation. As suggested
by Equation 6.2, the probability that a generation is decoded by an exit OR depends
on the generation size gs and number of ORs per layer n in the multicast tree.
Figure 20(a) shows the variations of loss probability when generation size in-
creases. The decoding probability decreases with increase in gs because more number
of linearly independent packets are needed by an exit OR to start decoding. When
decoding probability is high, the loss probability is less. Figure 20(a) indicates that as
gs increase the loss probability increases. Experimently obtained values are compared
to the values calculated from equation 6.2.
Since each exit OR receives n packets for a generation, the loss probability
decreases with increase in number of ORs per layer n, as there is a greater chance that
an exit OR will receive gs linearly independent packets. This explains the decrease
in loss probability with increase in n, as shown in Figure 20(b). Number of layers
in the multicast tree do not effect the decoding probability because the packets are
forwarded from one layer to another and decoding probability depends on number
of encoded packets received by the exit layer ORs and generation size. So even if
number of layers are varied the decoding probability remains the same.
7.3.2 Throughput Variations
By Varying Generation Size
The experimently calculated throughput values are compared to theoritical
values calculated from Equation 6.3. Figure 21(a) shows throughput variations when
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Figure 20: Comparison of Theoretical and Practical Values of Loss Probability
gs is increased from 5 to 10. When other parameters are kept constant, the through-
put decreases with increase in generation size because as gs increases, more number
of linearly independent encoded packets are required by the exit ORs to decode. As
gs increases, the loss probability increases leading to a decrease in throughput as
suggested in Equation 6.3. It can be seen that rate of throughput decrease is less for
n = 20 than n = 15 because loss probability is less for higher value of n.
The detection rate of a communication using the proposed system is obtained
using entropy which is calculated by applying the concept of mutual information
and correlation on the packet timings gathered at the sender and all of the the exit
ORs. Figure 21(b) and Figure 21(c) show the entropy values calculated from entropy
values calculated from mutual information technique and correlation. It can be seen
that entropy calculated from experiments are almost equal to the entropy of equal
distribution indicating that all the exit ORs received similar amount of traffic. So the
probability of detecting the traffic is equal to probability of a random guess which is
1/n. As the number of exit ORs increases, the entropy increases which decreases the
probability of detection. The probability of detection is less for n = 20 compared to
n = 15.
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Figure 21: Comparison of Theoretical and Practical Values of Throughput and De-
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By Varying Number of Layers
The round trip time increases with number of layers because the hop count
increases with layers. When the number of hops (delay) increases, the throughput of
a TCP communication decreases as suggested by the Equation 6.3 and this explains
the dip in the value of throughput in the Figure 22(a) for increase in number of layers
(nl) from 4 to 20 in steps of 4. In Figure 22(b) and Figure 22(c) it can be seen
that varying nl in the multicast tree does not change the detection rate because the
detection rate depends on packet timings and among the ORs in a layer rather than
the number of layers.
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Figure 22: Comparison of Theoretical and Practical Values of Throughput and De-
tection Rate for n =15, 20 and gs = 5, 10
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By Varying Number of ORs Per Layer (n)
In Figure 23(a), n is varied from 10 to 25 in steps of 5. The throughput
value increases with increase in the number of ORs per layer because an exit OR will
receive n encoded packets and so the probability of receiving gs independent packets
is higher. A tree with n =25 has greater throughput than n =10 as indicated in the
Figure 23(a). In Figure 23(b) and Figure 23(c) the entropy for n =25 is greater than
n =10 because the traffic is equally distributed among larger group of exit ORs.
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Figure 23: Comparison of Theoretical and Practical Values of Throughput and De-
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CHAPTER VIII
POSSIBLE ATTACKS
We merge the idea of network coding with the concept of onion routing to
disrupt timing attacks while still preserving the important qualities of onion routing
to disrupt many other attacks.
• Packet counting : Using network coding we combine packets from different users
to form a batch/generation and these set of packets are encoded/decoded to-
gether. So simple packet count technique will not reveal any information as
destination will receive more packets as it has to decode after collecting gs
packets to get the actual information.
• Payload Check : Since we are using onion routing, a layer of onion is decrypted
at every hop. So the input packet at a node is not identical to output packet.
The adversary cannot map the input traffic to output traffic just depending on
the payload.
• Finger printing : In order to launch this attack the adversary first creates a
traffic pattern for well known servers depending on the file transfer and compares
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the traffic pattern of a user against database of known server traffic pattern.
Since forward traffic uses different multicast tree from the multicast tree of
reverse traffic, it will be difficult to build the incoming traffic pattern because
of encoding/decoding process and collection of gs packets.
• Compromise the keys: The packets are iteratively encrypted with the session
keys the source OR has established with the intermediate ORs. Even if the
session key of a layer is compromised the adversary cannot get any information
due to other layers of encryption which are not yet decrypted. The effect of
these attacks can be reduced further by periodically changing the session keys.
If the TLS key is compromised then the effect will last only for the life time of
that particular key [7].
• Running a hostile OR: By using network coding we are spreading the informa-
tion equally in all the encoded packets and the destination has to collect gs
packets to decode. Even if the adversary is dropping few packets it will not
affect the communication any anonymity but it will affect the loss probability.
• Introducing timing patterns: The adversary can introduce timing patterns into
the traffic but it will not affect the communication because the destination has
to get gs packets of a generation and does not care about the order or the sender
of those packets ( as long as it is previous layer OR). If the packets on a link
are delayed then the destination will decode with the packets it received from
other OR and carry on with the communication.
• Tagging Attacks : By integrity checks we can avoid such attacks where the packet
contents are altered [7].We also use TLS encryption that would identify and
alteration to the encode packets.
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• End to End timing Correlation These attacks are not a part of design goals.
Such attacks can be avoided by being a part of the anonymous communication
system rather than just a user because the traffic inside the system cannot be
detected.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
An onion routing based anonymous communication system is presented which
disrupts the timing analysis attacks. The detection rate for different sizes of the
multicast tree is calculated. The probability detecting a communication is equal to
probability of detection through a random guess which is 1/n. Number of OR’s in
the leaf layer can be increased to increase the degree of anonymity. The information
spreading quality of network coding helps to produce similar traffic on all the links.
Since packets from multiple communications can be combined to produce an encoded
output traffic that evenly spreads in the tree, detecting the traffic based on timing
information becomes very difficult. An exit OR just needs to collect any but sufficient
encoded packets to decode and get actual information. The TCP throughput of a
communication using the proposed system is compared with the value obtained from
Equation 6.3. The loss probability in packet based forwarding technique and binary
code based technique can be decreased by increasing the number ORs per layer of
the multicast tree.
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